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The thirty-fifth Dana Boardman Lecture on Christian Ethics at the
Univeaity of Pennsylvania was coordinated with funds provided by
The John Templeton Foundation and the University Lecture Series of
the Center for Theology and the Natural Sciences (Berkeley) so that a
short conference on Creation and Theory of Evolution could be presented. The object was to enrich explorations of religion and science by
offering two significant and different approaches to the question of
human origins.
Noted geneticist Francisco Ayala of the University of California
(Irvine) explained the present state of our understanding of evolution
and argued that such human phenomena as morality and religion are
by-products of the evolutionary process that cannot be explained by
natural selection. His lecture, after some revisions by the author,
appears in this publication as "The Evolutionary Transcendence of
Humankind".
The Boardman Lecturer, Dr. Wolfhart Pannenberg, a well known
theologian and Emeritus Professor at the University of Munich, developed a theological argument. Dr. Pannenberg stressed that the God of
religious faith must be the Creator of the same nature that is studied by
scientists. To illustrate one application of this claim, he explored aspects
of the Genesis creation story that are compatible with the theory
of evolution. His lecture "Human Life: Creation Versus Evolution?"
challenges us to see that "Vistls"need not describe the relationship of
Creation and Evolution.
Both Dr. Ayala and Dr. Pannenberg have written extensively on
questions of science, philosophy and religion.

I would like to thank Professor Stephen Dunning, who organized the
conference, for his assistance in preparing this publication.
Susan Marks
University of Pennsylvania
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O n June 6, 1899, the Trustees of the University of Pennsylvania
accepted from the Reverend George Dana Boardman, D.D., LL.D.,
and Mrs.Ella Cove11 Boardman, his wife, a Deed of Gift, providing for
a foundation to be known as "The Boardman Lectureship in Christian
Ethics", the income of the fund to be expended solely for the purposes
of the Trust. Dr. Boardman served the University for twenty-three years
as Trustee, for a time as Chaplain, and often as Ethical Lecturer. After
providing for refunding out of the said income, any depreciation which
might occur in the capital sum, the remainder is to be expected in
procuring the delivery in each year at the University of Pennsylvania,
one or more lectures on Christian Ethics from the standpoint of the
life, example and teachings of the Lord Jesus Christ, and in the publication in book form, of the said lecture or lectures within four months
of the completion of their delivery. The volume in which they are printed shall always have its forefront a printed statement of the history,
outline, and terms of the Foundation.
O n July 6, 1899, a Standing Committee on "The Boardman
~ e c t u r & h iin~ Christian Ethics" was constituted, to which shall be
committed the nominations of the lecturers and the publications of the
lectures in accordance with the Trust.
O n February 6, 1900, on the recommendation of this committee,
the Reverend George Dana Boardman, D.D., LL.D., was appointed
Lecturer on Christian Ethics on the Boardman Foundation for the current year.

xiii

THEBOARDMAN
LECTURESHIP
IN CHRISTIAN
ETHICS:
THEORIGINAL
OUTLINE
WRITTEN
BY
DR.GEORGE
DANABOARDMAN
AND
MRS.ELLACOVELL
BOARDMAN
IN 1899
I. THE PURPOSE
First, the purpose is not to trace the history of the various ethical theories; this already done in our own noble University. Nor is it the purpose to
teach theology, whether natural, Biblical, or ecclesiastical. But the purpose
of this Lectureship is to teach Christian Ethics; that is to say, the practical
application of the precepts and behavior of JESUS CHRIST to everyday life.
And this is the greatest of the sciences. It is a great thing to know astronomy; for it is the science of mighty orbs, stupendous distances, majestic
adjustments in time and space. It is a great thing to know biology; for it is
the science of living organisms - the starting, growth, health, movements, life
itself. It is a great thing to know law; for it is the science of legislation, government, equity, civilization. It is a great thing to know philosophy; for it is
the science of men and things. It is a great thing to know theology; for it is
the science of God. But what avails it to know everything in space from atom
to star, everything in time from protoplasm to Deity, ifwe do not know how
to manage ourselves amid the complex, delicate ever-varying duties of daily
life? What will it profit a man if he gain the whole world - the world geographical, commercial, political, intellectual, and after all lose his own soul?
What can a University give in exchange for a Christlike character?Thus it is
that ethics is the science of sciences. Very significant is the motto of our own
noble University - "Literae Sine Moribus Vanae".
And Jesus of Nazareth is the supreme ethical authority. When we come
to receive from Him our final awards, he will not ask, "What was your theory of atoms? What did you think about evolution? What was your doctrine
of atonement?What was your mode of baptism?" But he will ask,"What did
you do with Me? Did you accept Me as your personal standard of character?
Were you a practical everyday Christian?" Christian Ethics will be the judgement test.
In sum, the purpose of this Lectureship in Christian Ethics is to build up
human character after the model of Jesus Christ.

11. RANGE OF THE LECTURESHIP
Secondly, the Range of the Lectureship. This range should be as wide
as human society itself. The following is offered in way of general outline
and suggestive hints, each hint being of course but a specific or technical
illustration growing out of some vaster underlying Principle.

1. Man's Heart-Nature. - And, first, man's religious nature. For exam~ l e :Christian (not merely ethical) precepts concerning man's
capacity for religion; worship; communion; divineness; immortality;
duty of religious observances; the Beatitudes; in brief, Manliness in
Christ.
2. Man's Mind-Nature. - Secondly, man's intellect-nature. For example:
Christian precepts concerning reason; imagination; invention; aesthetics; language, whether spoken, written, sung, builded, painted
chiseled, acted, etc.

3. Man's Society-Nature. - Thirdly, man's society-nature.
For example:
(a) Christian precepts concerning the personal lifk: for instance: conscientiousness, honesty, truthfulness, charity, chastity, courage,
independence, chivalry, patience, altruism, etc.
(b) Christian precepts concerning family life; for instance: marriage,
divorce; duties of husbands, wives, parents, children, kindred,
servants, place of woman, etc.
(c) Christian precepts concerning the business life; for instance:
rights of labor; rights of capital; right of pecuniary independence;
living within means; life insurance; keeping morally accurate
accounts; endorsing; borrowing; prompt liquidation; sacredness
of trust funds, personal and corporate; individual moral responsibility of directors and officers; trust-combinations; strikes;
boycotting; limits of speculation; profiting by ambiguities; single
tax; nationalization of property, etc.
(d) Christian precepts concerning the civic life; for instance: responsibilities of citizenship; elective franchise; obligations of office; classlegislation; legal oaths; custom-house conscience; sumptuary laws;
public institutions, whether educational, ameliorative, or reformatory;
hnction of money; standard of money; public credit; civic refbrms;
caucuses, etc.

xvi

(e) Christian precepts concerning international life; for
instance: treaties; diplomacy; war; arbitration; disarmament; tariE reciprocity; mankind, etc.

(f) Christian precepts concerning ecclesiastical life: for
instance: sectarianism, comity in mission fields; co-operation; unification of Christendom, etc.
(g) Christian precepts concerning the academic life; for
instance: literary and scientific ideals, professional standards of morality; function of the press; copyrights; obligations of scholarship, etc.
In sum, Christian precepts concerning the tremendous problems
of sociology, present and future.
Not that all the lectures must agree at every point; often there are
genuine cases of conscience, or reasonable doubt, in which a good
deal can be justly said on both sides. The supreme point is this:
Whatever the topic may be, the lecturer must discuss it conscientiously, in light of Christ's own teachings and character; and so awaken the consciences of his listeners, making their moral sense more
acute.

4. Man's Body-Nature. - Fourthly, man's body-nature. For
example: Christian precepts concerning environment; heredity,
health, cleanliness, temperance; self-control; athletics; public
hygiene; tenement-houses; prophylactics; the five senses;
treatment of animals, etc.
In sum, the range of topics for this Lectureship in Christian
Ethics should include whatever tends to society-building, or perfection of personal character in Christ. Surely, here is material enough,
and this without any need of duplication, for centuries to come.

xvii

111. SPIRIT O F T H E LECTURESHIP
Thirdly, the Spirit of this Lectureship. Every lecture must be presented
from the standpoint ofJesus Christ. It must be distinctly understood and the
founder of the Lectureship cannot emphasize the point too strongly, that
every lecture in these successive courses must be unambiguously Christian;
that is, from the viewpoint of the Divine Son of Mary. This Lectureship
must be something more than a lectureship in moral philosophy, or in a
church theology; it must be a lectureship in Christian morality, or practical
ethics from the standpoint of Christ's own personal character, example, and
teachings.
IV. QUALIFICATIONS O F T H E LECTURER
Fourthly, the Qualification of the Lecturer. The founder hopes that the .
lecturer may often be, perhaps generally, a layman; for instance: a merchant,
a banker, a lawyer, a statesman, a physician, a scientist, a professor, an artist,
a craftsman, for Christian ethics is a matter of daily practical life rather than
of metaphysical theology. The founder cares not what the ecclesiastical connection of the lecturer may be: whether Baptist or an Episcopalian, a Quaker
or a Latinist; for Christian ethics as Christ's behavior is not a matter of ecclesiastical ordination or of sect. The only pivotal condition of the Lectureship
in this particular is this: The lecturer himself must be unconditionally loyal
to our only King, our Lord Jesus Christ; for Jesus Christ Himself is the
world's true, everlasting Ethics.

CREATION
AND THE
THEORY OF EVOLUTION

THE EVOLUTIONARY TRANSCENDENCE
OF HUMANKIND
Francisco J. Ayala
Department of Ecology and Evolutionary Biology
University of California, Irvine

9 SETTINGTHE STAGE
It does not take a great deal of biolo ical expertise to realize that
humans have organs and limbs similar to t ose of other animals; that we
bear our youn like other mammals; that, bone by bone, there is a precise correspon ence between the skeletons of a chim anzee and a human.
It also does not take much reflection to notice the istinct uniqueness of
our species. There is the bipedal gait and the enlarged brain. Much more
conspicuous than the anatomical differences are the distinct behaviors
and their outcomes. Humans have elaborate social and political institutions, codes of law, literature and art, ethics and religion; humans build
roads and cities, travel by motorcars, ships and airplanes, and communicate by means of telephones, com uters and televisions.
I will first, in the ages that fo low, set forth the biological continuity
between humans an animals. I outline what we currently know about
the evolutionary history of humans for the last four million years, from
bipedal but small-brained Australo ithecus to modern Homo sapiens,
our species, through the prolific toormaker Homo habilis and the continent-wanderer Homo erectus. The genes of livin humans manifest that
our ancestors were no fewer than several thousan individuals at any one
time in the history of these hominid species.
I shall, then, identify anatomical traits that distinguish us from other
animals, and oint out our two kinds of heredity, the biological and the
cultural. Bio ogical inheritance is based on the transmission of genetic
information, in humans very much the same as in other sexually reproducing organisms. But cultural inheritance is distinctively human, based
on transmission of information by a teaching and learning process, which
is, in principle, independent of biological parentage. Cultural inheritance
makes possible the cumulative transmission of experience from generation to generation. Cultural heredity is a swifter and more effective
(because it can be designed) mode of adaptation to the environment than
the biological mode. The advent of cultural heredity ushered in cultural
evolution, which transcends biological evolution.
In the latter part of this lecture, I explore ethical behavior as a model
case of a distinctive human trait, and seek to ascertain the causal connections between human ethics and human biology. My conclusions are that
(1) the proclivity to make ethical judgments, i.e., to evaluate actions as
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either good or evil, is rooted in our (biological) nature, a necessary outcome of our exalted intelligence; but (2) the moral codes which guide
our decisions as to which actions are ood and which ones are evil, are
products of culture, including socia and religious traditions. This,
second conclusion contradicts those evolutionists and sociobiologists
who claim that the morally good is simply that which is promoted by
the process of biological evolution.

f

9 HUMANORIGINS
Mankind is a biological species that has evolved from other species that
were not human. In order to understand human nature, we must know
our biological make-up and whence we come, the story of our humbler
For a century after the publication of Darwin's On the
Ori
beginnin?.
in o Species in 1859, the story of evolution was reconstructed with
f
from paleontology (the study of fossils), biogeogra hy (the
evic ence
study of the geogra hical distribution of organisms), and rom the
comparative study o living organisms: their morphology, development,
d the like. Since mid-twentieth century we have, in addiption,
h y smo
i o l ecular
O ~an biology, the most informative and precise discipline for
reconstructing the ancestral relationships of living species.
Our closest biological relatives are the great a es and, among them, the
chimpanzees, who are more related to us than t l! ey are to the gorillas, and
much more than to the orangutans. The hominid lineage diverged from
the chimpanzee lineage 5-7 million years ago (Mya) and it evolved exclusively on the African continent until the emergence of Homo erectus, somewhat before 1.8 Mya. The first known hominid, Ardipithecus rumidus,
lived 4.4 Mya, but it is not certain that it was bipedal or in the direct line
of descent to modern humans, Homo supiens. The recently described
Australopithecw anamensis, dated 3.9-4.2 Mya, was bipedal and has been
placed in the line of descent to Austral0 ithecus ufarensis, Homo habilis, H.
erectus, and H sa~iens.Other homini s, not in the direct line of descent
ujicunus, Purunthropus uethiopito modern humks, are ~wtrulo~ithec&
cus. l? boisei, and I! robustus. who lived in Africa at various times between
3 and 1 Mya, a riod when three or four hominid species lived contem~oraneouslvin t e African continent.
Shortly 'after its emergence in tropical or subtropical eastern Africa,
H. erectus spread to other continents. Fossil remains of H. erectus are
known from Africa, Indonesia (Java), China, the Middle East, and
Europe. H, erectus fossils from Java have been dated 1.81t0.04 and
1.66t0.04 Mya, and from Georgia between 1.6 and 1.8 Mya.
Anatomically distinctive H erectus fossils have been found in Spain,
deposited before 780,000 years ago, the oldest in southern Europe.
The transition from H. erectus to H. sa iens occurred around 400,000
years ago, although this date is not well etermined owing to uncertainty as to whether some fossils are erectus or "archaic" forms of sapiens.
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H. erectus persisted for some time in Asia, until 250,000 years ago in
China and perhaps until 100,000 ago in Java, and thus was coetaneous
with early members of its descendant species, H. supiens. Fossil remains
of Neandertal hominids (Homo neundcrthalensis) appeared in Europe
around 200,000 years ago and persisted until thirty or forty thousand
years ago. The Neandertals had, like H. sapiens, large brains. A few years
ago, they were thou ht to be ancestral to anatomically modern humans,
but now we know t at modern humans appeared at least 100,000 years
ago, much before the disap earance of the Neandertals. Moreover, in
caves in the Middle East, ossils of modern humans have been found
dated 120,000-100,000 years ago, as well as Neandertals dated at 60,000
and 70,000 years ago, followed again by modern humans dated at 40,000
years ago. It is unclear whether the two forms repeatedly replaced one
another by migration from other regions, or whether they coexisted in
some areas. Recent genetic evidence indicates that interbreeding between
sapiens and neunderthalensis never occurred.
There is considerable controversy about the origin of modern humans.
Some anthropologists argue that the transition from H. erectus to archaic
H.sapiens and later to anatomically modern humans occurred consonantly in various parts of the Old World. Proponents of this "multiregional model" emphasize fossil evidence showing regional continuity in
the transition from H. erectus to archaic and then modern H. sapiens. In
order to account for the transition from one to another species (something which cannot hap en independently in several places), they
postulate that genetic exc ange occurred from time to time between
populations, so that the species evolved as a single gene pool, even thou h
geographic differentiation occurred and persisted, just as geographicafly
differentiated populations exist in other animal species, as well as in
living humans. This explanation depends on the occurrence of persistent
migrations and interbreeding between populations from different continents, of which no direct evidence exists. Moreover, it is dificult to
reconcile the multiregional model with the contemporary existence of
different species or forms in different regions, such as the persistence of
H. erectus in China and Java for more than one hundred thousand years
sapiens. Other scientists argue instead that
after the emergence of
modern humans first arose in Africa or in the Middle East somewhat
prior to 100,000 years ago, and from there spread throu hout the world,
replacing the preexisting populations of H. erectus or ar aic H. sapiens.
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9 How MANYHUMANS
Some proponents of this "African replacement" model claim further
that the transition from archaic to modern H. sapiens was associated with
a very narrow bottleneck, consisting of only two or very few individuals
who are the ancestors of all modern mankind. This particular claim of a
narrow bottleneck is supported, erroneously as I will soon show, by the

investigation of a peculiar small fraction of our genetic inheritance, the
mitochondrial DNA (mtDNA). The African (or Middle East) origin of
modern humans is, however, supported by a wealth of recent genetic
evidence and is, therefore, favored by many evolutionists.
The genetic information we inherit from our parents is encoded in the
linear sequence of the DNA's four nucleotide components (represented
by A, C , G, T ) in the same fashion as semantic information is encoded in
the sequence of letters of a written text. Most of the DNA is contained
in the chromosomes inside the cell nucleus. The total amount of DNA
in a human cell nucleus consists of six thousand million nucleotides, half
in each set of 23 chromosomes inherited from each parent. A relatively
small amount of DNA, about 16,000 nucleotides, exists in the mitochondria, cell organelles outside the nucleus. The mtDNA is inherited in
a peculiar manner, that is, exclusively along the maternal line. The inheritance of the mtDNA is a gender mirror image of the inheritance of the
family name. Sons and daughters inherit their mtDNA from their
mother but only the daughters transmit it to their progeny, just as sons
and daughters receive the family name of the father, but only the sons
transmit it to their children.
Analysis of the mtDNA from ethnically diverse individuals has shown
that the mtDNA sequences of modern humans coalesce to one ancestral
sequence, the "mitochondrial Eve" that existed in Africa about 200,000
years ago'. This Eve, however, is not the one mother from whom all
humans descend, but an mtDNA molecule (or the woman carrier of that
molecule) from whom all modern mtDNA molecules descend.
Some science writers have drawn the inference that all humans descend
from only one, or very few women, but this is based on a confusion
between gene genealogies and individual genealogies. Gene genealogies
radually coalesce towards a unique DNA ancestral sequence (in a simie r fashion as living species, such as humans, chimpanzees, and orillas,
coalesce into one ancestral species). Individual genealogies, on t e contrary, increase by a factor of two in each ancestral generation: an individual has two parents, four grandparents, and so on2. Coalescence of a ene
genealogy into one ancestral gene, originally present in one indivi ual,
does not disallow the contemporary existence of many other individuals,
who are also our ancestors, and from whom we have inherited the other
genes.
This conclusion can be illustrated with an analogy. My family name is
shared by many people, who live in S ain, Mexico, the Philippines, and
other countries. An historian of our f'amily name has concluded that all
Ayalas descend from Don Lope Sdnchez de Ayala, randson of Don Vela,
vassal of King Alfonso VI, who established the omain ("sefiorlo") de
Ayala in the year 1085, in the now Spanish Basque province of Alava.
Don Lope is the Adam from whom we all descend on the paternal line,
but we also descend from many other men and women who lived in the
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eleventh centur%a well as earlier and later.
The inference warranted by the mt
mitochondrial Eve is the ancestor of mod
line. Any person has a single ancestor in the matwnaI Iinr in any given
peration. Thus a person inherits the mtDNA from the mother, from
the maternal grandmother, from the great grandmother on the maternal
line, and so on. But the person also inherits other enes from other
- ,1
ancestors. The mtDNA that we have inherited from tf e mitochondria1
75
Ewe represents one-four-hundred-thousandth of the DNA present in any
is
modern human (sixteen thousand out of six billion nucleotides). The rest
nf the DNA, 400,000 times more than the mtDNA, we have inherited
from other contemporaries of the mitochondria1 Eve.
!
From how many contemporaries? The issue of how many huma
ancestors we had in the past has been elucidated by investigating the
genes of the human immune system3. The genes of the human leukocyte
antigen (HLA) complex exist in multiple versions, which provide peo le
with the diversity necessary to confront bacteria and other pathogens t at
J:'
invade the body. The evolutionary hiitory of some of these genes shows
chat they coalesce into ancestral genes 30-60 Mya, that is, much before
the divergence of humans and apes. (Indeed, humans and apes share
many of these
makes it possible to
in any one generation in order to account for
diverse genes throu
mated effective num
"effsnive" number
number, but it is a
. 1..
patible with much larger but not much smaller numbers ofindividuals in
- ;>,:
different generations. Thus, through millions of years our ancestors exis*: !, ;,.:;
ed in populations that were 100,000 individuals strong, or larger.
i
Population bottlenecks may have occurred o n rare occasions. But the
,',
enetic evidence indicates that human populations never consisted $
.,;
than several thousand individuals.
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.dr FROMBIOLOGY
TO CULTURE
y- - ".. .
The most distinctive human anatomical traits are erect posture ant&$'".
Lcge brain. We are the only vertebrate species with a bipedal gait and
... .
erect posture; birds are bipedal, but their backbone stands horizontal
mher than vertical. Brain size is generally
,.
relative to body mass, humans have the largest
The chimpanzee's brain weighs less than a pound; a
more. The human male adult brain is 1400 cubic
three pounds in weight.
Evolutionists used to raise the question whether bipedal gait or large
brain came first, or whether they evolved consonantly. The issue is now

resolved. Our Awtralopirhecus ancestors had, since four million years ago,
a bipedal gait, but a small brain, about 450 cc, a ound in weight. Brain
size starts to increase notably with our Homo ha zlis ancestors, about 2.5
Mya, who had a brain about 650 cc and also were prolific tool-makers
(hence the name habilis). Between one and two million years afterwards,
there lived Homo erectus, with adult brains up to 1200 cc. Our species,
Homo sapiens, has a brain about three times .as large as that of
AustraIopithecus, 1300-1400 cc, or some three pounds of gray matter. Our
brain is not only much larger than that of chimpanzees or gorillas, but
also much more complex. The cerebral cortex, where the higher co nitive functions are processed, is in humans disproportionally greater t an
che rest of the brain when compared to apes.
Erect posture and lar e brain are not the only anatomical traits that
distinguish us from non uman primates, even if they may be the most
obvious. A list of our most distinctive anatomical features includes the
following (of which the last five items are not detectable in fossils):
Erect posture and bipedal gait (entail changes of the backbone,
hipbone, and feet)
Opposing thumbs and arm and hand changes (make possible precise
manipulation)
Lar e brain
Re uction of jaws and remodeling of face
Changes in skin and skin glands
Reduction in body hair
Cryptic ovulation (and extended female sexual receptivity)
Slow development
Modification of vocal tract and larynx
Reorganization of the brain
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Humans are notably different from other animals not only in anatomy,
but also and no less importantly in their behavior, both individually and
socially. A list of distinctive human behavioral traits includes the following:
Subtle expression of emotions
Intelligence: abstract thinking, categorizing, and reasoning
Symbolic (creative) language
Self-awareness and death-awareness
Tool-making and technology
Science, literature, and art
Ethics and religion
Social or anization and cooperation (division of labor)
Legal c&s and political institutions
Humans live in groups that are socially organized, and so do other
primates. But primate societies do not approach the complexity of
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human social organization. A distinctive human social trait is culture,
which may be understood as the set of non-strictly biological human
activities and creations. Culture includes social and political institutions,
ways of doing things, religious and ethical traditions, language, common
sense and scientific knowledge, art and literature, technology, and in
general all the creations of the human mind. The advent of culture has
brought with it cultural evolution, a superorganic mode of evolution
superimposed on the organic mode, and which has in the last few
millennia become the dominant mode of human evolution. Cultural
evolution has come about because of cultural change and inheritance, a
distinctively human mode of achieving adaptations to the environment
and transmitting the adaptations through the generations.
Humans have two kinds of heredity-biological and cultural, which
may also be called organic and superorganic, or endosomatic and exosomatic systems of heredity. Biological inheritance in humans is very much
like that in any other sexually reproducin organism; it is based on the
transmission of genetic information enco ed in DNA from one generation to the next by means of the sex cells. Cultural inheritance, on the
other hand, is based on transmission of information by a teaching-learning process, which is in principle independent of biological parentage.
Culture is transmitted by instruction and learning, by example and
imitation, through books, newspapers and radio, television and motion
pictures, through works of art, and by any other means of communication. Culture is acquired by every person from parents, relatives and
neighbors, and from the whole human environment.
Cultural inheritance makes possible for humans what no other organism can accomplish-the cumulative transmission of experience from
generation to generation. Animals can learn from experience, but they do
not transmit their experiences, their "discoveries," to the following
generations (at least not to any large extent). Animals have individual
memory, but they do not have a "social memory." Humans, on the other
hand, have developed a culture because they can transmit cumulatively
their experiences from generation to generation.
Cultural inheritance makes possible cultural evolution, that is, the
evolution of knowledge, social structures, ethics, and all other components that make up human culture. Cultural inheritance makes possible
a new mode of adaptation to the environment that is not available to
nonhuman organisms-adaptation by means of culture. Organisms in
general adapt to the environment by means of natural selection, by
changing their genetic constitution over generations to suit the demands
of the environment. But humans, and humans alone, can also adapt by
changing the environment to suit the needs of their genes. (Animals
build nests and modify their environment also in other ways, but the
manipulation of the environment by any nonhuman species is trivial
compared to that by humans.) For the last few millennia humans have
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been adapting the environment to their genes more often than their genes
to the environment.
In order to extend its geographical habitat, or to survive in a changing
environment, a population of organisms must become adapted, through
slow accumulation of genetic variants sorted out by natural selection, to
the new climatic conditions, different sources of food, different com etitors, and so on. The discovery of fire and the use of shelter and clot ing
allowed humans to spread from the warm tropical and subtropical regions
of the Old World to the whole earth, except for the frozen wastes of
Antarctica, without the anatomical development of fur or hair. Humans
did not wait for genetic mutants promoting wing development; they have
conquered the air in a somewhat more efficient and versatile way by
building flying machines. People travel the rivers and the seas without
gills or fins. The exploration of outer space has started without waiting
for mutations providing humans with the ability to breathe with low oxygen pressures or to function in the absence of gravity; astronauts carry
their own oxygen and specially equipped pressure suits. From their
obscure beginnings in Africa, humans have become the most widespread
and abundant species of mammal on earth. It was the appearance of
culture as a superorganic form of adaptation that made humans the most
successful animal species.
Cultural adaptation has prevailed in mankind over biological adaptation because it is a more rapid mode of adaptation and because it can be
directed. A favorable genetic mutation newly arisen in an individual can
be transmitted to a sizeable part of the human species only through innumerable generations. However, a new scientific discovery or technical
achievement can be transmitted to all humans, potentially at least, in less
than one generation. Moreover, whenever a need arises, culture can
directly pursue the appropriate changes to meet the challenge. O n the
contrary, biological adaptation depends on the accidental availability of a
favorable mutation, or of a combination of several mutations, at the time
and place where the need arises.
Erect osture and large brain are distinctive anatomical features of
modern umans. High intelligence, symbolic languaf, religion, and
ethics are some of the behavioral traits that distinguis us from other
animals. The account of human origins that I have sketched implies a
continuity in the evolutionary process that goes from our nonhuman
ancestors of eight million years ago through primitive hominids to modern humans. A icientific explanatio of that evolutionary sequence must
account for th mergence of hum anatomical and behavioral traits in
terms of natural selection together with other distinctive biological causes and processes. One explanatory strategy is to focus on a particular
human feature and seek to identify the conditions under which this feature may have been favored by natural selection. Such a strategy may lead
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to erroneous conclusions as a consequence of the fallacy of selective attention: some traits may have come about not because they are themselves
adaptive, but rather because they are associated with traits that are favored
by natural selection.
Geneticists have long recognized the phenomenon of "pleiotropy," the
expression of a gene in different organs or anatomical traits. It follows
that a gene that becomes changed owing to its effects on a certain trait
will result in the modification of other traits as well. The changes of these
other traits are epigenetic consequences of the changes directly promoted
by natural selection. The cascade of consequences may be, particularly in
the case of humans, very long and far from obvious in some cases.
Literature, art, science, and technology are among the behavioral features
that may have come about not because they were adaptively favored in
human evolution, but because they are expressions of the high intellectual abilities present in modern humans: what may have been favored by
natural selection (its "target") was an increase in intellectual ability rather
than of those particular activities as such.

I

O WHENCE
ETHICS
AND VALUES?
I now will briefly explore ethics and ethical behavior as a model case of
how we may seek the evolutionary explanation of a distinctively human
trait. I select ethical behavior because morality is a human trait that seems
remote from biological rocesses. My goal is to ascertain whether an
account can be advance of ethical behavior as an outcome of biological
evolution and, if such is the case, whether ethical behavior was directly
promoted by natural selection, or has rather come about as an epigenetic
manifestation of some other trait that was the tar et of natural selection.
I will argue that ethical behavior (the proc ivity to judge human
actions as either good or evil) has evolved as a consequence of natural
selection, not because it was adaptive in itself, but rather as a pleiotropic
consequence of the high intelligence characteristic of humans. However,
I will first point out that the question whether ethical behavior is biologically determined may refer either to (1) the capacity for ethics (i.e., the
proclivity to judge human actions as either right or wrong) and which I
will refer to as "ethical behavior," or (2) the moral norms or moral codes
accepted by human beings for guiding their actions. My theses are that:
(1) the capacity for ethics is a necessary attribute of human nature, and
thus a product of biological evolution; but (2) moral norms are products
of cultural evolution, not of biological evolution.
My first thesis is grounded on the argument that humans exhibit ethical behavior because their biological makeup determines the presence of
the three necessary, and jointly sufficient, conditions for ethical behavior:
the ability to anticipate the consequences of one's own actions, the ability to make value judgments, and the ability to choose between alternative
courses of action. I thus maintain that ethical behavior came about in
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evolution not because it is adaptive in itself, but as a necessary conseuence of humanity's eminent intellectual abilities, which are an attribute
Iirectly promoted by natural selection.
My second thesis contradicts the proposal of many distinguished
evolutionists who, since Darwin's time, have argued that the norms of
morality are derived from biological evolution. It also contradicts the
sociobiologists who have recently developed a subtle version of that
proposal. The sociobiologists' argument is that human ethical norms are
sociocultural correlates of behaviors fostered by biological evolution.
I argue that such proposals are misguided and do not escape the naturalistic fallacy. It is true that both natural selection and moral norms sometimes coincide on the same behavior; i.e., the two are consistent. But this
isomorphism between the behaviors promoted by natural selection and
those sanctioned by moral norms exists only with respect to the conseuences of the behaviors; the underlying causations are completely
]ispar ate.
I shall now develop these ideas.

*:* ETHICAL
JUDGMENTS VERSUS ETHICAL
NORMS
I have noted that the question of whether ethical behavior is
biologically determined may refer to either one of the following issues:
(1) Is the capacity for ethics-the
roclivity to judge human actions as
either right or wrongdetermine! by the biological nature of human
beings? (2) Are the systems or codes of ethical norms accepted by human
beings biologically determined? A similar distinction can be made with
respect to Ian uage. The issue whether the ca acity for symbolic language
is determine by our biological nature is dif ferent from the question of
whether the particular language we speak (English, Spanish, or Japanese)
is biologically necessary.
The first uestion posed is more fundamental; it asks whether or not
the biologics nature of Homo sapiens is such that humans are necessarily
inclined to make moral judgments and to accept ethical values, to identify certain actions as either right or wrong. Affirmative answers to this
first question do not necessarily determine what the answer to the second
question should be. Independently of whether or not humans are necessarily ethical, it remains to be determined whether particular moral
prescriptions are in fact determined by our biological nature, or whether
they are chosen by society, or by individuals. Even if we were to condude
that people cannot avoid having moral standards of conduct, it might be
that the choice of the particular standards used for judgment would be
arbitrary, or that it depended on some other, nonbiological criteria. The
need for havin moral values does not necessarily tell us what these moral
values should e, just as the capacity for language does not determine
which language we will speak.
The thesis I propose is that humans are ethical beings by their
biological nature. Humans evaluate their behavior as either right or
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wrong, moral or immoral, as a consequence of their eminent intellectual
capacities which include self-awareness and abstract thinking. These
intellectual ca acities are products of the evolutionary process, but they
are distinctive y human. Thus, I maintain that ethical behavior is not
causally related to the social behavior of animals, including sin and
reciprocal "altruism."
A second thesis that I put forward is that the moral norms according to
which we evaluate particular actions as morally either good or bad (as well
as the grounds that may be used to justify the moral norms) are products
of cultural evolution, not of biological evolution. The norms of morality
belong, in this respect, to the same category of phenomena as the
languages spoken by different peoples, their political and reli ious institutions, and the arts, sciences, and technology. The moral co es, like these
other products of human culture, are often consistent with the biological
predispositions of the human species, dispositions we may to some extent
share with other animals. But this consistency between ethical norms and
biological tendencies is not necessary or univer : it does not apply to all
uman societies.
ethical norms in a given society, much less in
Moral codes, like any other dimensions of c turd systems, depend on
the existence of human biological nature and must be consistent with it
in the sense that they could not counteract it without promoting their
own demise. Moreover, the acceptance and persistence of moral norms is
facilitated whenever they are consistent with biologically conditioned
human behaviors. But the moral norms are independent of such behaviors in the sense that some norms may not favor, and may hinder, the
survival and reproduction of the individual and its genes, which are the
targets of biological evolution. Discrepancies between accepted moral
rules and biological survival are, however, necessarily limited in scope or
would otherwise lead to the extinction of the groups accepting such
discrepant rules:
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$ THECAPACITY
FOR

MORALREASONING
I argue that the question whether ethical behavior is determined by our

biological nature must be answered in the affirmative. By "ethical behavior" I mean here to refer to the urge toward judging human actions as
either good or bad, which is not the same as "good behavior" (i.e., doing
what is perceived as good instead of what is perceived as evil). Humans
exhibit ethical behavior by nature because their biological constitution
determines the presence in them of the three necessary, and jointly sufficient, conditions for ethical behavior. These conditions are: (a) the ability to anticipate the consequences of one's own actions; (b) the ability to
make value judgments; and (c) the ability to choose between alternative
courses of action. I shall briefly examine each of these abilities and show
that they exist as a consequence of the eminent intellectual capacity of
human beings.
The ability to anticipate the consequences of one's own actions is the
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most fundamental of the three conditions required for ethical behavior.
Only if I can anticipate that pulling the trigger will shoot the bullet,
which in turn will strike and kill my enemy, can the action of pulling the
trigger be evaluated as nefarious. Pulling a trigger is not in itself a moral
action; it becomes so by virtue of its relevant consequences. My action
has an ethical dimension only if I do anticipate these consequences.
The ability to anticipate the consequences of one's actions is closely
related to the ability to establish the connection between means and ends;
that is, of seeing a mean precisely as mean, as somethin that serves a
articular end or purpose. This ability to establish t e connection
petween means and their ends requires the ability to anticipate the future
and to form mental ima es of realities not present or not yet in existence.
The ability to estab ~ s hthe connection between means and ends
happens to be the fundamental intellectual capacity that has made possible the development of human culture and technology. The evolutionary
roots of this capacity may be found in the evolution of bipedal gait, which
transformed the anterior limbs of our ancestors from organs of locomotion into organs of manipulation. The hands thereby gradually became
or ans adept for the construction and use of objects for hunting and
ot er activities that improved survival and reproduction, that is, that
increased the reproductive fitness of their carriers.
The construction of tools, however, depends not only on manual
dexterity, but in perceiving them precisely as tools, as objects that help to
perform certain actions, that is, as means that serve certain ends or
purposes: a knife for cutting, an arrow for hunting, an animal skin for
protecting the body from the cold. The hypothesis I am propounding is
that natural selection promoted the intellectual capacity of our biped
ancestors, because increased intelligence facilitated the perception of tools
as tools, and therefore their construction and use, with the ensuing
amelioration of biological survival and reproduction.
The development of the intellectual abilities of our ancestors took
place over two million years or longer, gradually increasing the ability to
connect means with their ends and, hence, the possibility of making ever
more complex tools servin remote purposes. The ability to anticipate
the future, essential for et ical behavior, is therefore closely associated
with the development of the ability to construct tools, an ability that has
produced the advanced technologies of modern societies and that is largely responsible for the success of mankind as a biological species.
The second condition for the existence of ethical behavior is the ability to make value judgments, to perceive certain objects or deeds as more
desirable than others. Only if I can see the death of my enemy as preferable to his or her survival (or vice versa) can the action leading to his or
her demise be thought of as moral. If the alternative conse uences of an
action are neutral with respect to value, the action cannot e characterized as ethical. The ability to make value judgments depends on the
capacity for abstraction, that is, on the capacity to perceive actions or

f

B

1
I

f

f

I
1

1

objects as members of general classes. This makes it possible to compare
ob'ects or actions with one another and to perceive some as more desirab e than others. The capacity for abstraction, necessary to perceiving
individual objects or actions as members of general classes, requires an
advanced intelligence such as exists in humans and apparently in them
alone. Thus, I see the ability to make value judgments primarily as an
implicit consequence of the enhanced intelligence favored by natural
selection in human evolution. Nevertheless, valuing certain objects or
actions and choosing them over their alternatives can be of biological
consequence; doing this in terms of general categories can be beneficial in
practice.
Moral judgments are a particular class of value judgments; namely
those where preference is not dictated by one's own interest or profit, but
by regard for others, which may cause benefits to particular individuals
(altruism), or take into consideration the interests of a social group to
which one belongs. Value judgments indicate preference for what is
perceived as good and rejection of what is perceived as bad; good and bad
may refer to monetary, aesthetic, or all sorts of other kinds of values.
Moral judgments concern the values of right and wrong in human
conduct.
The third condition necessary for ethical behavior is the ability to
choose between alternative courses of action. Pulling the trigger can be a
moral action only if I have the option not to pull it. A necessary action
beyond our control is not a moral action: the circulation of the blood or
the digestion of food are not moral actions.
Whether there is free will has been much discussed by philosophers,
and this is not the appropriate place to review the arguments. I will only
advance two considerations based on our common-sense experience.
One is our profound personal conviction that the possibility of choosing
between alternatives is enuine rather than only apparent4. The second
consideration is that w en we confront a given situation that requires
action on our part, we are able mentally to explore alternative courses of
action, thereby extending the field within which we can exercise our free
will. In any case, if there were no free will, there would be no ethical
behavior; morality would only be an illusion. The point that I wish to
make here is, however, that free will is dependent on the existence of a
well-developed intelligence, which makes it ossible to explore alternative
courses of action and to choose one or anot er in view of the anticipated
consequences.
In summary, my proposal is that ethical behavior is an attribute of the
biological make-up of humans and is, in that sense, a product of biological
evolution. But I see no evidence that ethical behavior developed because it
was adaptive in itselE I find it hard to see how maiuuting certain actions as
either good or evil (as opposed to just choosing some actions rather than
others, or evaluating them with respect to their practical consequences)
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would promote the reproductive fitness of the evaluators. Nor do I see how
there might be some form of "incipient" ethical behavior that would then
be further promoted by natural selection. The three necessary conditions for
there being ethical behavior are manifestations of advanced intellectual
abilities.
It rather seems that the likely target of natural selection may have been
the develo ment of these advanced intellectual capacities. This development was avored by natural selection because the construction and use of
tools improved the strategic position of our bi ed ancestors. Once
bipedalism evolved and tool-using and tool-ma 'n became possible,
those individuals more effective in these functions ha a greater probability of biological success. The biological advantage provided by the design
and use of tools persisted long enough so that intellectual abilities
continued to increase, eventually yielding the eminent development of
intelligence that is characteristic of Homo sapienz.
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.t. THECONTENT
OF MORAL
NORMS
There are many theories concerned with the rational grounds for
morality, such as deductive theories that seek to discover the axioms or
fundamental principles that determine what is morally correct on the
basis of direct moral intuition. There also are theories, like logical
positivism or existentialism, which negate rational foundations for morality, reducing moral princi les to emotional decisions or to other irrational
grounds. Since the pu!I lication of Darwin's theory of evolution by
natural selection, philosophers as well as biologists have attempted to find
in the evolutionary process the justification for moral norms. The common ground to all such proposals is that evolution is a natural process
that achieves goals that are desirable and thereby morally good; indeed it
has produced humans. Proponents of these ideas claim that only the
evolutionary goals can give moral value to human action: whether a
human deed is morally right depends on whether it directly or indirectly
promotes the evolutionary process and its natural objectives.
Herbert Spencer5was perhaps the first philosopher seeking to find the
grounds of morality in biological evolution. More recent attempts
include those of the distinguished evolutionists J.S. Hwley" and C.H.
Waddington7, and of Edward 0.
Wilsona, Y, founder of sociobiology as an
independent discipline engaged in discovering the biological foundations
of social behavior. I have argued elsewhere'" that the moral theories
proposed by Spencer, Huxley, and Waddington are mistaken and fail to
avoid the naturalistic fallacy". These authors argue, in one or another
fashion, that the standard by which human actions are judged good or
evil derives from the contribution the actions make to evolutionary
progress. A blunder of this argumentation is that it is based on value
jud ments about what is or is not progressive in (particularly human)
evo utionI2. There is nothing objective in the evolutionary process itself
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that makes the success of bacteria, which have persisted for more than
three billion years and in enormous diversity and numbers, less "progressive" than that of the vertebrates, even though the latter are more
~ornplex'~.Nor are the insects, of which more than one million species
exist, less successful or less progressive from a purely biological perspective than humans or any other mammal species. Moreover, the roponents of evolution-grounded moral codes fail to demonstrate w y the
promotion of biological evolution by itself should be the standard to
measure what is morally good.
The most recent and most subtle attempt to ground the moral codes
on the evolutionary process emanates from the sociobiologists, particularly from E.O.Wilsona, ', who starts by proposing that "scientists and
humanists should consider together the possibility that the time has come
for ethics to be removed temporarily from the hands of the philosophers
and bi~logicized."'~The sociobiologists argue that our perception that
morality exists is an epigenetic manifestation of our genes, which s d
mani ulate humans as to make them believe that some behaviors a k
mora ly "good" so that people behave in ways that are good for their
enes. Humans might not otherwise pursue these behaviors (altruism,
for example) because their genetic benefit is not apparent (except to
sociobiologists after the development of their discipline)l5.
As I have argued elsewhere, the sociobiologists' account of the
evolution of the moral sense is misguidedlo,
As I have shown above,
we make moral judgments as a consequence of our eminent intellectual
abilities, not as an innate way for achieving biological gain. Moreover, the
sociobiologists' position may be inter reted as calling for the supposition
that those norms of morality should e considered supreme that achieve
the most biological (genetic) ain (because that is, in their view, why the
moral sense evolved at all). T is, in turn, would justify social preferences,
including racism and even genocide, that many of us (sociobiologists
included) judge morally obtuse and even heinous.
The evaluation of moral codes or human actions must take into
account biological knowledge, but biology is insuficient for determining
which moral codes are, or should be, accepted. This may be reiterated by
returning to the analogy with human languages. Our biological nature
determines the sounds that we can or cannot utter and also constrains
human language in other ways. But a language's syntax and vocabulary
are not determined by our biological nature (otherwise, there could not
be a multitude of tongues), but are products of human culture. Likewise,
moral norms are not determined by biological processes, but by cultural
traditions and principles that are products of human history.
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9 CONCLUDING
REMARKS:
SCIENCE
AND ITS LIMITS
Science is a wondrously successful way of knowing. Science seeks
explanations of the natural world by formulating hypotheses that are

subject to the possibility of empirical falsification or corroboration. A
scientific hypothesis is tested by ascertaining whether or not predictions
about the world of experience derived as logical consequences from the
hypothesis agree with what is actually observed". Science is a mode of
inquiry into the nature of the universe that has been successful and of
great consequence. Witness the proliferation of science academic departments in universities and other research institutions, the enormous
budgets that the body politic and the private sector willin ly commit to
scientific research, and its economic impact. The OfFice o Management
and the Budget (OMB) of the U.S. government has estimated that fifty
percent of all economic growth in the United States since the Second
World War can directly be attributed to scientific knowledge and technological advances. The technology derived from scientific knowledge
pervades our lives: the high-rise buildings of our cities, thruways and long
span-bridges, rockets that take us to the moon, telephones that provide
instant communication across continents, computers that perform
complex calculations in millionths of a second, vaccines and drugs that
keep bacterial parasites at bay, gene therapies that replace DNA in defective cells. All these remarkable achievements bear witness to the validity
of the scientific knowledge from which they originated.
Scientific knowledge is also remarkable in the way it emerges by wa
of consensus and agreement among scientists, and in the way new know edge builds upon past accomplishment rather than startin anew with
each generation or each new ractitioner. Surely scientists Isagree with
each other on many matters; !ut these are issues not yet settled, and the
oints of disagreement generally do not bring into question previous
Lowledge. Modern scientists do not challenge that atoms exist, or that
there is a universe with a myriad stars, or that heredity is encased in the
DNA.
Science is a way of knowing, but it is not the only way. Knowledge
also derives from other sources, such as common sense, artistic and
religious experience, and philosophical reflection. The validity of the
knowledge acquired by non-scientific modes of inquiry can be simply
established by pointing out that science dawned in the sixteenth century,
but mankind had for centuries built cities and roads, brought forth olitical institutions and sophisticated codes of law, advanced pro ound
philosophies and value systems, and created magnificent plastic art, as
well as music and literature. We thus learn about ourselves and about the
world in which we live and we also benefit from products of this non-scientific knowledge. The crops we harvest and the animals we husband
emerged millennia before the dawn of science from practices set down by
farmers in the Middle East, Andean Sierras, and Mayan plateaus.
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It is not my intention in this essay's final section to belabor the extraordinary fruits of nonscientific modes of inquiry. I wish simply to state
something that is obvious, but becomes at times clouded by hubris, an
infirmit of mores that all too often aflicts members of my profession.
Success ul as it is, and universally encompassing as its subject is, a scientific view of the world is hopelessly incomplete. There are matters of
value and meaning that are outside the sco e of science. Even when we
achieve scientific understanding of a natura object or process, we are still
missing matters that may well be thought by many to be of equal or
greater import. Scientific knowledge may enrich aesthetic and moral
erce tions, and may illuminate the significance of life and the world,
put tRese are matters outside the realm of science.
O n April 28, 1937, early in the Spanish Civil War, Nazi airplanes
bombed the small B ue town of Guernica, the first time that a civilian
population had been eterminedly destroyed from the air. The Spanish
painter Pablo Picasso had recently been commissioned by the Spanish
Republican Government to paint a large composition for the Spanish
pavilion at the Paris World Exhibition of 1937. In a frenz of manic
energy, the enraged Picasso sketched in two days and fully out ined in ten
more days his famous Gucmica, an immense painting of 25 feet, 8 inches by 11 feet, 6 inches. Suppose that I now would describe the images
represented in the
their size and position, as well as the
pigments used and t
of the canvas. This description would be
of interest, but it
be satis6ing if I had completely omitted
aesthetic analysis and considerations of meaning, the dramatic message of
the inhumanity conveyed by the outstretched figure of the mother
pulling her slaughtered baby, the bellowing faces, the wounded horse or
the satanic image of the bull.
Let Gucrnica be a metaphor of the point I wish to make. Scientific
knowledge, like the description of size, materials, and geometry of
Guernica, is satisfying and useful. But once science has had its say, there
remains unsettled much about reality that is of interest, questions of value
and meaning that are forever beyond the scope of science. In order to
understand ourselves and our place in the economy of things, we need
much more than scientific knowledge. We need psychology and sociology, as well as history, aesthetics and philosophy; if we seek religious understanding, we'll profit from theology.
My purpose in this essay has been to provide what I see as a necessary
dimension, the biological one, of any view of human nature that seeks to
be relevant and complete. But I do not pretend that biology provides
now, or ever will provide, a complete understanding of what we humans
are and our place in the universei0.
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3 Ever since its first publication by Charles Darwin in 1859, the doctrine
of evolution of livin forms and species by natural selection among individual variations wit in a given population in a struggle for survival, has
been a matter of dispute among scientists and of ideological controversy.
The dispute among scientists, however, did not center on the issue of
whether there is or can be a process of evolution of higher organized species
from lower forms of life. Rather, the scientific discussions were mainly
concerned with the question of whether the principle of natural selection
is sufficient to ex lain the process of the emergence of ever new and more
complex forms o life. There are a number of difficult questions related to
this issue. First of all, what is the standard requirement according to which
selection operates? Is adaptation to external conditions the standard of
fitness for natural selection, as the mechanistic interpretation of Darwinism
in the late 19th century assumed, or does the spontaneous productivity of
genetic variation lead to the discovery of new natural "niches" for survival
and consequently of new objects for adaptation? Furthermore, can a
continuous and cumulative occurrence of small variants under the pressures of natural selection issue in the emergence of a new species, or do
small changes tend to disappear because they don't fit in the overall system
of the organism and of its functioning? Would, then, a "fulguration"[a
lightning flash] of a complete new scheme of organization be required for
a new species to emerge? Finally, how is the
evolutionar process towards ever more complex
accounted or? These are but a few of the more
plagued Darwinism from the start and still continue to vex its defenders.
Nevertheless, the general erspective of the Darwinian theory has been
victorious, though it is stil hypothetical and the evidence for it rests on a
somewhat defective fossil record rather than on experiential demonstration,
since new species are not easy to create by experiment. For all its difficulties, the theory of evolution still provides the most plausible interpretation
of what is known about the history of organic life on this planet.
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Resistance to this new theory from the side of the churches had been
predictable, since it stood in clear contrast, if not contradiction to the
traditional concept of creation. For many centuries it had been taken for
granted that, according to the Biblical account in the first chapter of
Genesis, the species of plants and animals had been created by God on the
fifth and the sixth day of creation and remained unchanged ever since. It
is the position that so-called "creationists" defend to the present day. Even
among those who did not cling to Biblical literalism, however, it seemed

unacceptable that the theory of evolution re laced God's purposive action
in bringing about the different forms of li e by a mechanical process of
nature. In this controversy, the point is that before Darwin the purposive
action of the creator had been understood to provide the only explanation
for the fact of different s ecies of animal life. Therefore, the proposal of a
natural explanation for t e same result was taken as a denial of God's purposive action in the creation of living forms. In principle, of course, the
assum tion of God's purposive action need not have excluded the use of
natur causes in the execution of the Divine pur ose. In hct, however,
after Darwin's book On the Origin of Species had een published, Divine
purpose and the mechanical operation of natural causes were taken as
mutually exclusive.
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Given the antagonistic climate of the early discussions on Darwin's
theory, it is astonishing that from the beginning some leading British
churchmen and theologians tried to reinterpret Christian doctrine in light
of the perspective of evolution. The most remarkable of these attempts was
a book edited by Charles Gore in 1889 under the title Lux Muncti: A Series
of Studies in the Religion of the Incarnation. As the title suggests, the book
reinterpreted the Incarnation of the Divine Logos in Jesus Christ in terms
of providin the culmination of the evolution of life. While the process of
natural evo ution culminates in the emer ence of the human race, so the
history of the human race reached its cfimax in the incarnation. To a
certain extent, such a theological scheme was su ested by early Church
Fathers like Irenaeus. But now the picture of a s
ty leadin toward the event of the incarnation
by inclu lng the process of natural evolution of life as prehistory of that
salvific history. Interestingly, the authors contributin to L w Mundi did
not take the Darwinian evolution to describe a mec a n i d process, but
rather a historical process. That was hardly warranted by the evolutionary
theory prevalent around 1890. Lux M u d i rather pointed beyond that
theory to a future concept of "emergent" or "organic ' evolution, as it was
pro osed in 1923 by Lloyd Morgan. "Emergence" means that in each step
o f t e evolutionary process something new comes into existence. It does
not merely " result' b mechanic necessity from past conditions. This
concept of "emergenty' evolution vindicated the ositive evaluation of
Darwinism by the group of Lux Mundi, who had ce ebrated the new theory for doing away with the God of deism who had been responsible for the
beginnin s only, while now God could be seen to be active in every new
turn of t e evolutionary process. The concept of "emergentn evolution
overcame the mechanistic, reductionistic way of describing Darwin's theory. And the tendency to emphasize the element of the new in the sequence
of evolving forms of life was further stren thened by the realization that
of new schemes
major steps in the evolutionary process nee!"hlgurations"
of organization rather than a sequence of small steps of cumulative variations.
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9 After providing the stage for a theological discussion of evolution, I now
turn to the crucial issue of whether a theological appropriation of the
doctrine of evolution can do justice to the Genesis account of the creation
of animal species by God. In the third section of this paper the same question will be asked with regard to the human race. What has been said so far
on the further development and refinement of the theory of evolution since
Darwin, will prove helphl in the attempt to answer both these questions.
When we turn to the Biblical account of creation, the first thing must
be to remind ourselves that the Biblical texts are historical documents and
have to be interpreted in terms of what the were trying to say at the time
of their composition. This principle of istorical interpretation of the
Bible is the core issue in all discussions with creationists. Historical interpretation reads the Biblical &~rmations relative to the time of their
writing, to the concerns of their authors at the time of their writing, and to
the knowledge they had at their disposal. Such historical inter retation
does not imply that the Biblical affirmations, being limited to t eir own
time, had nothing to tell readers of a much later period. Rather, whatever
they have to tell us, they convey precisely in their historical particularity.
To the degree that their affirmations have universal significance, it is inherent in their historical particularity. Otherwise this significance would not
be the meanin of the Biblical affirmations, but a meaning the modern
interpreter rea s into them. Furthermore, the historical reading of the
Biblical &lrmations does not preclude their appreciation as the Word of
God; the Word that is addressing us like every generation of humanity.
The Word of God expressed in the Biblical affirmations is, however, a
unified entity. It is the Word of God that became incarnate in Jesus Christ.
To read or hear the Bible as the Word of God is to relate each particular
Biblical affirmation to the whole of the Biblical witness and to interpret the
detailed, historical1 distinctive affirmations in that light. Therefore,
reverence for the Bi le as the Word of God does not stand in opposition to
a careful historical scrutiny of each individual sentence.
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With regard to the Biblical report on the creation of the world in the
first chapter of Genesis, this means that we have to read its affirmations as
witnessing to the God of Israel, the Creator of the world, through the use
of the natural science of the sixth century BCE (i.e. Babylonian wisdom),
in order to account for the sequence of creatures coming forth from God's
creative activity. The relevance of this report in our present situation, then,
is primarily the encouragement to use the science of our da in a similar
way - for the purpose of witnessing today to the God of?' the Bible as
Creator of the universe, as we know it. This is the authority of the Biblical
report on the creation of the world. It calls us to attempt our own theology of nature, but in doing so to remain true to the peculiar and distinctive
nature of the God of Israel, just as the authors of the priestly report on the
creation of the World did in their own time.

The authority of the Biblical report does not require us to consider
every detail as the last word on any given issue. Many statements are
inevitably indebted to the limited knowledge of nature in the Gth century
BCE. One example is the idea that the experience of rain is evidence of a
huge su ply of water in heaven above the clouds, comparable to the
oceans own below. On this assumption, it is astonishin that the waters
above the clouds normally remain se arated from those eneath. This is
explained by the idea (Gen. I:GC.) t at God created a vault to keep the
waters above from pourin down. This mechanism is completely rational,
and yet this beautiful an important detail can no longer be part of our
conception of nature. The same applies to the assumption that all the
different ty es of creatures, and especially all the different species of plants
and anima s were created in the beginning and remain permanently
unchan ed. This idea is an example of the mythical attitude of mind in
early cu tures, where generally, as Mircea Eliade told us, the world order
was conceived as having been built in the "original time" without later
change. By contrast, modern knowledge of nature possesses sufficient
evidence for assuming that the natural world is in a continuous process of
becoming. The continuous emergence of new types of creatures and the
disappearance of others is part of that picture.
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Does the modern conception of nature in terms of continuous change
contradict the Biblical doctrine of creation? It is certainly at variance with
the account, in the first chapter of Genesis, that the whole order of creation
was produced in six days and continues to exist unchanged. Thus God laid
down the order of heaven and earth and this became the model for the
order of time, which repeats the first seven days every week. But with the
Bible as a whole this is not the only conception of God's creative activity.
Rather, in the rophetic writings we learn that God is continuously active
in the course o history, and that once in awhile He creates something uite
new (Is. 48:Gf.). That is not to deny the creation of heaven and eart in
the beginning. But second Isaiah takes that as an example of God's
continuously creative activity. This, then, is the model of a continuous
creation which is coextensive with the course of the world's history, and
within which the creation of heaven and earth in the beginning was only
the initial stage. This rophetic conception of God's creative activity is
much closer to the mo ern understanding of nature in terms of a histo
of the universe than is the image of the six-day-creation in Genesis. Suc
a conception of continuous creation does not have difficulties with a
doctrine of evolution, according to which the different species of animals
emerge successively in the long process of life's history on earth.
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There is one requirement, however, that must be met if the concept of
evolution is to be compatible with a the010 of nature based on the
Biblical idea of God. That is the assumption o something new that occurs
in each and every single event, but also in the emergence of new forms of

P

life in the process of evolution. This element of contingency was not in the
focus of the early mechanistic interpretation of Darwinism, but it has been
increasingly emphasized in the conception of epigenesis, which means the
emergence of something new, and in the concept of emergent evolution.
Why is the element of contingency so important in a the010 ical appropriation of the theory of evolution? The reason is that the Bib e conceives
of God's relationship to the world in terms of free, creative acts, in the
course of history as well as with reference to the beginning of this world.
In the first chapter of the Bible, this concern for God's freedom in his
creative activity is expressed in the concept of the Divine word which
brin s about its effect in the most effortless way. In each creative act, God's
freecfom brings forth something new sim ly by His word. Therefore the
history of the world is seen as an irreversib e sequence of contingent events,
notwithstanding all the regularities that can be observed in its course.
Consequent1 a concept of evolution in terms of a purely mechanical
process wou d not be easy to reconcile with the Biblical idea of God's
creative activity, while the concept of an epigenetic process of evolution
with somethin new occurring in virtually every single event is perfectly
compatible wit it.
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On the other hand, God's creative activity does not exclude the employment of secondar causes in bringing about God's creatures. In the 6th
century priestly ocument on creation preserved in the first chapter of
Genesis, the Creator tells the earth to bring forth vegetation (Gen. 1: 11).
And again it is the earth that is called upon to produce animals, es ecially
mammals (Gen. 1:24). If our creationist friends today would ad ere, in
this case, to the letter of the Bible, they could have no objection a ainst the
emergence of organisms from inorganic matter, nor against the escent of
the higher animals from those initial stages of life. In the Biblical view,
such a mediation does not contradict the afirmation that the creatures are
the work of God. For in the next verse it is explicitly said that God made
the beasts and the cattle and everything that creeps u on the ground (Gen.
1:25). Of course, the Biblical text doesn't tell anytl!. lng about the higher
species of animals as having evolved from lower ones. But isn't that an
issue of secondary importance, when com ared with the question of
whether the act of creation must be conceive of as an immediate action of
God without any mediation by other creatures? This question, however,
has been answered already. The immediacy of God's creative action with
reference to God's creatures is not impaired by secondary causes, since their
activity is not on the same level with that of the Creator.
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The case of the human being is a special one, because human persons are
related to God in a special way. This fact is indicated by the importance of
religion in one form or another throughout the history of the human race.
Human self-consciousness seems closely connected with some form of

awareness of the divine. In the Bible, this close relationship to the origin of
the universe is expressed in the idea that the human person has been created
in the image of God. Therefore, the human being represents the Creator's
own self with regard to the rest of God's creation. Doesn't that require that
the human being was created by God alone, without the cooperation of
other, earlier creatures? In the first chapter of the Bible no such cooperation
is mentioned. Does that mean it is excluded?
The older report on the creation of human beings in the second chapter
of Genesis does not justify such a suggestion, because it says that the
human body was formed of "dust from the round" (Gen. 27). That
seems to be roughly equivalent to the role o f t e earth in the first chapter
of Genesis, when God tells the earth to bring forth plants and animals. In
the Biblical view the human body is taken from "the earth," just as was true
with the animals. Therefore, our body is perishable, which is to say, it will
return to the earth. Only the human spirit is said to come directly from
God. As the second chapter of the Bible describes it, God breathes His
breath into the figure He formed from the dust; He "breathed into his
nostrils the breath of life" (Gen. 2:7). Corres ondingly, with our last
breath we return the gift of the spirit to God, as t!I e psalm says. According
to the Gospel of Luke, Jesus quoted this psalm when he died on his cross:
"Into thy hand I commit m spirit" (Ps. 31:5; Luke 23:46). In the
moment of death the spirit or reath ets separated from the body, and, as
Ecclesiastes says, the dust returns to t e earth, to what was, and the spirit
returns to God who gave it" (Eccl. 12:7).
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Does that mean that we are allowed to think of the human body as
coming from the process of evolution of animal life, but not so of the
human soul and spirit? This could seem to be required by the older creation story when it says that the Creator breathes the breath of life into the
fi ure formed from clay and thereby man became a living being (Gen. 2:7).
T e Hebrew term here is nefish hayah, and nefesh was often translated as
"soul." Thus God is presented here as creating the human soul by breathing the spirit of life into the nostrils of the human body. It was from this
sentence that the old Christian creationism of the Patristic period derived
its theory about the origin of the human soul. While the body of each new
individual was considered to come from the chain of propagation, each
individual soul was believed to be added to the body by the Creator
Himself. But this Patristic creationism presup osed an independent status
of the soul as compared to the body, an i ea that is in keeping with
Platonism, but not with the Hebrew Scriptures. In the Old Testament
nefesh hayah, which we translated by the term "soul," is not independent of
the body, but rather the rinciple of its life, thou h not the origin of life
itself The ne esh is only t e continuous hunger an thirst for life. The root
meaning o f t e word is "throat." It is in constant need of the s irit of God,
that productive breath or wind which animates the soul and t rough the
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soul its body. The origin of life, then, is finally the divine spirit and not
the human soul. It is only through the spirit that the human being
becomes a "living soul," as the phrase in the creation story goes.
To be a "living soul," however, is not a distinctive prerogative of the
human bein . Accordin to the creation story in the first chapter of
B
Genesis, the 'breath of li e" is in all the animals, the beasts on the ground,
the birds in the air (Gen. 1:30). This corresponds exactly to the idea in the
earlier re rt on the creation of man, where God breathes the breath of life
into the lgure of clay so that it comes alive. If the animals have the breath
of life within themselves, although they are products of the earth which was
summoned by the Creator to bring them forth, then there is no difference
between this creation and the creation of the human being, with regard to
its description as "living soul," or nefesh hayah. The difference between the
human being and other animals is not that the human being has a "living
soul," but that it is destined to exist in a particular relationship to God, so
that it is called on to represent the Creator Himself with regard to the
animal world and even with regard to the earth (Gen, 1:26).
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The excursion into Biblical exegesis was necessary to meet the charge of
modern creationists that the doctrine of evolution, and especially the
derivation of the emergence of the human race from the evolutionary
process of animal life, contradicts the biblical creation stories. When in the
Bible animal life is seen as a product of the earth, and the formation of
human life as "livin soul" is understood as analogous to animal life, then
there is no reason w y the human being should not have emer ed from the
evolution of animal Iife. The idea of evolution as such is a mo ern concept
and cannot be derived from Biblical conceptions. But it is not opposed to
the basic concerns of the Biblical conceptions of the origin of animal life
and of human life. This can be affirmed as long as the modern idea of
evolution does not exclude the creative divine activity within the entire
process of evolution.
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The doarine of evolution is open to a theological interpretation when it
is conceived not in terms of a mechanical process (based on the principle of
natural selection), but as describing a process of emergence, in the course of
which the roductivity of life continuously produces something new, The
element o contingency in this concept of emergent evolution secures its
openness to the creative activity of God in this process. That each form of
life can be understood as a creature of God is not dependent on the idea of
purpose, the assumption of a purposehl adaptation of each species to the
conditions of its survival in its environment. In earlier times it was assumed
that such pur osehl adaptation presupposes and demonstrates the intelligent will o f t e Creator and is not reducible to other causes. It was this
assumption that Darwin destroyed by explaining the adaptation of a species
to its environment as a result of natural selection. But the theory of
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natural selection need not exclude the continuous activity of the Creator in
the very productivity of life. The notion of the superabundant creativity of
life is not an alternative to the creative action of God any more than is the
productivity of the earth, which, in the Biblical creation story, is called
upon by God to bring forth vegetation and even animals. The spontaneous
creativity of life is the form of God's creative activity.
In a modern perspective, self-organization is characteristic of life at all
levels of evolution. It accounts for s ontaneity in all forms of life, and it is
in this principle of spontaneous sel -organization that we have to perceive
the roots of human subjectivity. Self-organization is the principle of freedom and of superabundance in the creative advance of the evolutionary
process. Human self-consciousness is its highest manifestation so fir as we
can see, as it allows us to integrate all other consciousness into the unity of
our individual selves. Self-consciousness itself is not a given fact, however.
In each individual life history it arises from the early st es of the development of our consciousness. Self-consciousness itself is a ready a product of
the creativity of life within each one of us, a product of the creative
activity of the divine spirit.
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The creative self-organization of life in the process of evolution from
inorganic matter to the first or anisms, corresponds to the blowing of the
divine wind, the spirit of God t at breathes life into ever new creatures and
thus blows through the evolution of life until it overcomes all perishableness in the resurrection of Jesus Christ. The death of individuals is due,
according to the Biblical witness, to their limited share in the divine spirit
(Gen. 63). To Jesus, however, though a finite being himself, the spirit of
life was given "without measure" (John 3:34). Therefore he was raised
from the dead by the power of the spirit and transformed into a spiritual
body (1 Cor. 15:44sqq.), which is to say, into imperishable life, which is
im erishable because of its unbroken participation in the divine spirit who
is t e source of all life.
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A Christian account of the evolution of life as expression of the divine
s irit blowing through His creation cannot abstain from some reference to
t e eschatological resurrection of the dead, the climax of the creative activity of the divine spirit that was first realized in the resurrection of Jesus.
This climactic resurrection is meant to embrace human beings in general
by communion with Jesus and even, according to Paul, the world of other
creatures, because "creation itself will be set free from its bondage of decay
and obtain the glorious liberty of the children of God" (Romans 8:21).
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